Abstract An empirical argument is given in support of Percus & Sauerland's (2003) theory of 'de re' ascription, according to which the internal argument of believe is a function from concept-generators to propositions. The argument concerns pronouns in the scope of attitude verbs that are interpreted both 'de re' and as bound variables. It is argued that more traditional theories of 'de re' ascription -specifically, theories that take the 'res' to be an internal argument of believe -fail to account for such pronouns, as they predict that a pronoun cannot simultaneously be an argument of believe and bound by a quantifier in the scope of believe.
the quantifier. An example is given in (1), where every female student is the embedded subject and binds a pronoun -her.
(1) John believes that every female student i likes her i mother.
We make two claims regarding (1). Firstly, when (1) is judged against a multiple-guise scenario, it has a reading according to which John roughly thinks the following: "a likes b's mother, c likes d's mother and e likes f 's mother". An example of a multiple-guise scenario is one where John comes into contact with every actual female student more than once, and each actual female student appears each time in a different guise, but in John's mind the mapping between women and guises is one-to-one. In other words, if the same woman appears in two different guises, John fails to recognize this and thinks he came into contact with two different women.
Our second claim is that in order to capture all the relevant readings of (1) an in situ theory of 'de re' ascription, such as the one proposed in Percus & Sauerland (2003) , is needed. This theory yields (3) as one possible LF of (1) (in addition to other LFs, such as the 'de dicto' LF in (2)). We spell out our assumptions about the syntax-semantics interface in §2 (e.g. the assumptions regarding traces and world-denoting pronouns). For now, it suffices to note that in (3), the trace of every female student and the pronoun co-indexed with it are embedded inside a complex noun phrase whose head is a pronominal element -G n -which denotes a concept-generator, i.e. a function from individuals to individual concepts. In other words, a concept-generator supplies a guise. Since G 8 and G 9 in (3) may potentially supply different guises for the co-indexed (and co-valued) t 2 and her 2 , the resulting reading is such that, "in John's mind", the liker and the likee's daughter are not necessarily the same (though "in the speaker's mind" they are). The semantics assumed for believe, where the clausal complement is the only internal argument, yields the following interpretation: "There is a pair of guises G 1 , G 2 such that for every actual woman x, John believes that x-under-G 1 likes the mother of x-under-G 2 ". We refer to her 2 in (3), which
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Bound 'de re' pronouns and the LFs of attitude reports is a bound variable but "understood" by John as not co-valued with t 2 , as a 'bound de re' pronoun. In §2 we motivate the existence of 'bound de re' pronouns on empirical grounds and explain in detail why standard theories cannot account for such pronouns. In §3 we present a version of the 'de re' theory of Percus & Sauerland (2003) that predicts the existence of 'bound de re' pronouns. In §4 we show that intuitions regarding attitude reports with downwardentailing quantifiers in the clausal complement of the attitude verb (such as John believes that only Mary is French), judged against multiple-guise scenarios, suggest that believe is at least sometimes a universal -rather than existential -quantifier over guises.
2 What are 'bound de re' pronouns?
The problem and a first attempt at solving it
Our point of departure is (1), repeated below.
(4) John believes that every female student i likes her i mother.
We ask readers to ignore any reading where female student is interpreted 'de dicto' (i.e., any reading that implies that John's thought is roughly of the form: "Every female student likes. . . ") and any reading where her is interpreted referentially (i.e., any reading that implies that John's thought is roughly of the form: ". . . likes this woman"). Ignoring those 'de dicto' and referential readings, (1) is felicitous in two types of scenarios, corresponding to two different readings -the 'simple bound' reading and the 'bound de re' reading. The 'simple bound' reading is illustrated by a scenario where John is looking at the set of actual female students, saying to himself something like the following (without necessarily acknowledging that the individuals in question are students, or even female): "for each x such that x is one of these individuals here, x likes x's mother".
However, (1) is felicitous in other, stranger, scenarios. Imagine the set of actual female students is {Mary, Sally, Betty} and that John is looking at pairs of pictures of them (i.e., two pictures of Mary, two pictures of Sally, and two pictures of Betty). Again, he may not be aware that Mary, Sally, or Betty are students, or even female. For each pair, he mistakenly thinks its members are distinct from each other. That is to say, pointing first at the first member of the pair Mary, Mary and then at its second member, he says to himself something along the following lines: "This person likes that person's mother The bound 'de re' reading is not accounted for by most standard theories of attitude reports. Before we show this, let us first elaborate briefly on a data point brought to our attention by Ezra Keshet. The 'bound de re' reading, as we have described it, implies that the predicate mother is interpreted 'de dicto'. For Keshet and two of our consultants, the interpretation of the pronoun her in her mother as a 'de re' pronoun biases mother towards a 'de re' interpretation. This observation does not alter our claim. Examples likes (5a) and (5b), where the 'de re' pronoun isn't embedded inside a DP, as well as examples like (5c), where the 'de re' pronoun is embedded inside a 'de dicto' DP, all have 'bound de re' readings.
(5) a. John believes that every female student i thinks that she i is smart.
b. John believes that every female student i likes herself i .
c. John believes that every female student i likes her i unicorn.
This means that the existence of the 'bound de re' reading is independent of whether the embedding noun phrase -if there is one -is interpreted 'de re' or 'de dicto', and of whether the pronoun is embedded in another noun phrase at all. For this reason, and because most speakers still accept the reading of (1) where mother is interpreted 'de dicto', unless otherwise noted we use the term 'bound de re' reading to refer to the reading where her in her mother is interpreted 'de re' and mother is interpreted 'de dicto'. To see that standard theories of attitude reports struggle with 'bound de re' readings, it is necessary to take a little excursion into the syntax and semantics of 'de re' ascription. We look at Russellian theories as well as "relational" theories, starting with the former.
First, let us lay out our assumptions about the syntax-semantics interface. (Nothing important hinges on these; our arguments are compatible with a wide range of assumptions about syntax and interpretation.) Following Heim & Kratzer (1998) , we assume the rules of functional application and predicate modification (as shown in (6a) and (6b), where · g is an assigmentparametrized function from pieces of syntax to their interpretations).
(6) a. Functional application: For any branching node α with daughters β, γ and any assignment g, if β g ( γ g ) is defined, α g = β g ( γ g ).
b. Predicate modification: For any branching node α with daughters β, γ and any assignment g, if β g and γ g are type e, t ,
We also assume that quantificational DPs (type et, t ) in the object position of transitive verbs aren't interpretable in situ. (This follows from our assumptions about the typing of quantificational DPs and transitive verbs, and the operations available for interpreting branching nodes.) To yield an interpretable structure, quantificational DPs undergo LF movement (i.e. Quantifier Raising or QR) to a position of sentential scope. QR leaves behind a trace t n and inserts an operator λ n below the movement target such that λ n c-commands the co-indexed trace t n . For example, the LF of John saw every man is as in (7).
Phrases headed by λ-operators are interpreted as in (8), yielding (9), of type e, t , which is the proper type to combine with the quantificational DP, and yielding the truth conditions in (10).
(8) Abstraction: For any node α,
where g[n → y] is the assignment g differing at most from g in that g maps n to y.
iff every man g (λy . John saw y) = 1 iff {x : x is a man} ⊆ {x : John saw x}.
Next, our assumptions about intensionality. To simplify matters, we assume that predicates take pronominal world arguments. Like traces and individual-denoting pronouns, world pronouns can be abstracted over. We adopt the convention that all world pronouns free in the matrix (i.e. not bound Also for simplicity (and temporarily), we assume that believe has the Hintikkastyle (Hintikka 1962 (Hintikka , 1969 
Syntactically, we assume intensional verbs like believe trigger λ-abstraction over world pronouns (so we may have λ-operators without QR). Thus, John believes it's raining receives the LF in (12a) and the interpretation in (12b).
b. Dox John,@ ⊆ {w ∈ D s : it's raining in w}
We now return to the interpretation of quantificational phrases in the scope of attitude reports, beginning with Russellian approaches (approaches that roughly follow Russell 1905) . Notice first that the Russellian theory is not expressly built to handle the kind of 'de re' reading we are concerned with; the question is whether this sort of analysis can be extended to deal with 'bound de re' readings.
On the Russellian approach, the interpretation of a noun phrase in the scope of an attitude verb has to do with the noun phrase and the attitude verb's relative scope. For example, when some female student remains in situ, as in (13), the 'de dicto' reading of John believes that some female student is a fool arises. The 'de re' reading arises as a result of some female student QR-ing above believe, as in (14). (13) Fodor (1970) , according to which John's belief is roughly "One of these individuals -I'm not sure who -is a fool" while he is pointing at the actual female students. With universal quantifiers, however, the 'de re' and intermediate readings are indistinguishable:
(16) John believes that every female student is a fool.
Whenever every female student and believe have the same world argument, it does not matter whether we scope every female student above believe -itself a universal quantifier -or not. Both LFs -the Russellian (17a) and the nonRussellian (17b) -yield truth conditions equivalent to (17c a. Actual reading; no female student interpreted in situ: John says to himself, with certainty, pointing at the actual female students: "None of these individuals passed the exam".
b. Non-existent reading; no female student scoped out: No actual female student x is such that John says to himself, with certainty: "x passed the exam".
Notice now that (21), with a downward-entailing quantifier, has a 'bound de re' reading, on which John thinks "this woman doesn't like that woman's mother", for every actual female student.
(21) John is certain that no female student i likes her i mother.
In fact, (21) has a stronger reading than the one just described, which implies that for each pair x, y in John's mind (i.e., a pair corresponding to a single female), he thinks: "x doesn't like y's mother and y doesn't like x's mother". We come back to examples such as (21), and their stronger readings, in §4. In the meantime, it suffices to note that (21) has a 'bound de re' reading. Scoping the quantifier above believe would, again, result in incorrect truth conditions, as in (20b). The conclusion is that 'de re' ascription is not a simple matter of scope, and it is preferable to derive 'de re' readings of quantifiers In fact, using non-quantificational expressions, Quine (1956) (Reinhart 1997 , Kratzer 1998 , 2003 , and the singleton-indefinite strategy (Schwarzschild 2002) . The choice-function strategy does not treat some female student as a quantifier at all, and the singleton-indefinite strategy treats it as a quantifier with a singleton set restrictor.
5 Nor does simply making names non-rigid designators help matters since multiple-guise scenarios require multiple "Ortcutts" at each of Ralph's belief-alternatives.
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Bound 'de re' pronouns and the LFs of attitude reports course, knows that these women are one and the same.) Scoping only gives us the former reading. Quine's point is, of course, applicable to quantifiers as well. For example, John believes that every female student is French and, at the same time, he believes that every female student is German has a reading according to which John sees the same women on different occasions, and regarding every woman, he holds a pair of beliefs just like the pair he holds regarding Mary in (22b). Scoping, as we just saw, would not help us arrive at the relevant reading.
Yet it still feels like the 'bound de re' reading of (1) "needs" a wide-scoping LF à la (19), where the trace and the pronoun are contra-indexed. In §3 we will see that a specific solution to Quine's problem (namely, the solution due to Percus & Sauerland 2003) also solves the 'bound de re' problem posed by (1), by providing an LF that is not quite like (19), but which nevetheless leads to the reading where the liker and the daughter of the likee are not necessarily the same in John's mind (though they remain identical in the speaker's mind). Before introducing that solution, let us look at some traditional solutions to Quine's problem and convince ourselves that they, too, cannot solve the 'bound de re' pronouns problem posed by (1). Cresswell & von Stechow (1982) (following Kaplan 1968 and Lewis 1979) propose that believe re , defined in (24), is the main verb in 'de re' ascriptions such as John believes that Mary is French. 6 This verb is "relational": it takes the 'res' -the individual about whom John holds his belief (here Mary) -as its first internal argument, and a property-denoting expression of type e, s, t as its second internal argument. It requires an acquaintance relation to hold uniquely between the believer and the 'res' in the actual world, and between the believer and some individual in the believer's doxastic alternatives. Since the acquaintance relation only ever relates the attitude holder to a single individual at each relevant world, we'll speak, equivalently, of "acquaintance 6 We are again simplifying (see fn. 3). A more adequate version of believe re is this:
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(24) For any x and z in D e , any w in D s , any P in D e, s,t and any assignment g,
This second condition can be paraphrased thus: "For all doxastic alternatives w of x in w, F (w ) has property P in w ."
(25) Acquaintance functions: Given a suitable acquaintance relation R, attitude holder x, and world w, F is a suitable acquaintance function iff F (w) is the unique y such that R(w, x, y).
For a case like (22b), an acquaintance relation like
λwλyλx . x saw y wearing a gray coat in w might underlie F -which might in turn be something like λw . the y such that John saw y wearing a gray coat in w
-thereby supplying what we have been calling a guise. Thus, if the 'res' is Mary, John can ascribe French-ness to her under one acquaintance function, or guise ("the woman John saw wearing a red dress is French"), and Germanness under another acquaintance function, or guise ("the woman John saw wearing a gray coat is German"). The truth conditions of the 'de re' reading of John believes that Mary is French are then as in (26). (26) There is a suitable acquaintance function F such that i. F (@) = Mary, and
7 Two notes: (i) The definition refers to an acquaintance function's suitability. We intend that an acquaintance function is 'suitable' only if the corresponding acquaintance relation is 'vivid' in the sense of Kaplan (1968) . The restriction to vivid acquaintance functions is designed to avoid the so-called 'shortest-spy problem'. Aloni (2005) argues that vividness is actually the wrong notion: the relevant acquaintance functions (relations) should instead be non-trivializing. We are happy to adopt this; near as we can see, it's orthogonal to our arguments.
(ii) We are modeling all the interesting entailments here as non-presuppositional. We intend this only as a simplifying assumption.
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To account for the 'de re' truth conditions of John believes that every female student is French, (28), assume that a plurality or set, such as the set of actual female students, can be a 'res'. (We assume, following Schwarzschild (1996) , that both singularities and pluralities are sets of individuals, of type e.) Example (27) gives the revised semantics for believe, and (28) gives 'de re' truth conditions for John believes that every female student is French. Note that F in (27) and (28) is a "parametrized" acquaintance function; this effectively means that for every individual in the 'res' a potentially different acquaintance function is introduced. 
iff there is a function F from members of D e to suitable acquaintance functions such that i. for all z in y, F z (w) = z, and
(28) There is a function F from individuals to suitable acquaintance functions, such that 
Clearly, this theory involves unorthodox movement. One obvious concern is that the moved 'res' does not c-command its trace. Furthermore, in some cases such as (30), where Mary (construed 'de re') is inside a conjoined noun phrase, 'res'-movement violates one of the island constraints that seems the least violable, namely the Coordinate Structure Constraint (cf. Ross 1967) .
(30) John mistakenly believes he has a unicorn, and furthermore, he believes that his unicorn and Mary are fools.
Other theories have similar problems, and we will not review them here; we take 'res'-movement to be representative of this type of theories. Importantly, 'bound de re' readings are not captured by 'res'-movement. Let us elaborate on this point.
'Res'-movement and 'bound de re' pronouns
Making her an argument of believe as in (31) indeed creates an LF for (1) where the embedded traces are not co-indexed, but it takes her outside the scope of every, with the result that her can only be interpreted referentially. Notice that (31) requires us to say that believe is type-flexible and can take more than one 'res'-argument (something we need to assume anyway, because of examples such as John believes that Mary introduced Bill to Sue).
Since the 'res' argument in (i) is a singular individual, that LF doesn't require John to be acquainted with the entire set of female students. Moreover, if we 'res'-move female student but leave the pronoun in situ, we run into the same problem that afflicted the Russellian LFs -namely that the pronoun is still bound "in John's mind." Notice now that we would get the right reading if we scoped every female student all the way up, letting it bind both a trace-'res' and a pronoun-'res', which are co-indexed with each other.
But this option is excluded in view of the problems discussed in connection with (20)- (21) 
.1).
A more promising attempt might be (33), on the assumption that her g is the identity function (i.e. f : f is of type e, e and for every x ∈ Dom(f ), f (x) = x). 11 Then t 3 is a trace of type e, e . This yields the (simplified) truth conditions in (34). Informally, the idea is that the identity function is replaced in John's doxastic alternatives; very roughly, his confusion about the identity of the identity function "destroys the binding" in his mind. To make this work, we'd have to assume that her occurs with a silent type-e pronominal complement pro n ; in normal, non-'res'-movement cases, the fact that her g = ident ensures that her pro n g = pro n g . 
F is a suitable acquaintance function that picks out an e, e function for each w in its domain, and H supplies, for every x in its domain, a suitable acquaintance function that picks out an individual at each w in its domain (cf. (28)). This would require us to say that John is acquainted with the identity function (and we would have to adapt the semantics of believe re accordingly).
The idea is that John can fail to recognize the identity function and mistake it for some other function, with the result that, in his mind, John is pointing at two different individuals, for every pair of the form x, x that he is actually pointing at. Suppose, for instance, that the set of actual female students is {a, b, c} and that John is looking at the pairs a, a , b, b , c, c (more accurately, pairs of the corresponding pictures), but he thinks the pairs are a, b , b, c , c, a (and he doesn't know that a, b, and c are students). In addition, the values for F and H in (34) are as in (35), and (36) It then follows from (34) that in every w in Dox John,@ , a likes b's mother, b likes c's mother, and c likes a's mother (instead of believing that a likes a's mother, b likes b's mother, and c likes c's mother -a belief which would be more faithful to the actual pairs he is looking at). This correctly predicts that John believes that every female student likes her mother is felicitous even without binding "in John's mind".
Clearly, any proposal along these lines should motivate the assumption that individuals can be acquainted with functions. Since we'll ultimately reject this idea, we don't attempt to provide this foundation ourselves. Rather, we'll briefly explore the ramifications of this approach, should an independent motivation be adduced.
But here is a problem: if we do assume that acquaintance with functions is as described above, we predict, counter-intuitively, that (1) is felicitous in a situation where John sees every actual female student once, identifies each student correctly and says "for each x such that x is one of these individuals, x likes the mother of x's aunt". According to the LF in (33), this can happen, for example, when John confuses the identity function with the aunt-of function (even if he doesn't have any confusion regarding the identity of the individuals themselves). If this problem cannot be overcome, the generation of (33) must somehow be blocked, in which case the 'bound de re' reading would remain unaccounted for.
Gennaro Chierchia (p.c.) suggests a way to block this undesired reading, without blocking the generation of (33). Suppose there is a constraint on the kind of acquaintance functions which can possibly figure in 'de re' construals of e, e -functions. Specifically, suppose an individual y can be acquainted in the actual world with a function f (of type e, e ) through an acquaintance function F only if F is appropriate for y and f in the actual world -that is to say, only if there is a pair J, K such that for each x in Dom(f ), i. J x is a suitable acquaintance function which delivers x in the actual world (though it may deliver someone else in y's doxastic alternatives), and Table 1 Illustration of "extensional acquaintance"
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Betty = J a (w 1 ), and
For convenience, we call this suggested constraint on acquaintance with functions "extensional acquaintance". Given that the identity function is of type e, e , this constraint holds of it as well, with the result that John cannot simply mistake the identity function for the aunt-of function (this also means that John is acquainted with some sub-function of ident). The reason is that the identity function is the set of pairs x, x , and the aunt-of function is a set of pairs x, y such that, presumably, x ≠ y. So the only way for John to be confused about ident is for John to be confused about (some of) the individuals related to themselves by it. Put simply, if he isn't mistaken about the individuals, he cannot be mistaken about the function. This blocks the undesired reading of (33), where John does not misidentify the individuals themselves, but rather the identity function itself. If this solution is on the right track, we can account for the 'bound de re' reading with (33) without generating unattested readings. But this conclusion is incorrect. Here is a scenario in which the attitude holder is acquainted with the function but where John thinks every female student likes her mother nevertheless cannot be truthfully uttered. Suppose the set of actual female students is as before. In addition, the set of actual female professors is {d 1 , d 2 , d 3 }. John is looking at the following three sets of pictures, each consisting of three pairs: the first three pairs are a, a , b, b , c, c , the second three pairs are also a, a , b, b , c, c , and the third three pairs are
Suppose the values for F and H in (34) are as in (37) (39) a.
For every x such that x is a female student in @, H x (w ) is not a female student in w ; and
It follows from (34) that in every w in Dox John,@ , a likes d 1 's mother, b likes d 2 's mother, and c likes d 3 's mother. Importantly, the "mistaken function" - So once again, F picks out ident in @, and we predict John believes that every female student likes her mother to be felicitous. But this prediction is wrong; the sentence cannot report the state of affairs just described. In a sense, the confusion required by extensional acquaintance has happened "at the wrong place" -since only the female students matter for the 'bound de re' reading, the sub-function of ident which we, the theorists, want to inform extensional acquaintance is { a, a , b, b , c, c }; but instead, extensional acquaintance lets pass the "mistaken sub-function"
Absent an ad hoc appeal to context, it is not clear how this worry can be remedied; doing so clearly requires tools beyond the notion of extensional acquaintance (especially in view of the fact that John believes every female student likes her mother can be uttered felicitously in a similar scenario, where John makes the same identification mistakes, but also thinks that every first member in the second threesome likes the mother of the corresponding second member, and every first member in the third threesome hates the mother of the corresponding second member).
We conclude that (33) should not be generated. The reason for this, we've argued, is not that acquaintance with functions is constrained by "extensional acquaintance". Rather, (33) must violate some grammatical constraint. We do not commit ourselves to what that constraint is, though the following possibility comes to mind: suppose pronouns are always of type e, even when they are complex (i.e., composed of a function element of type e, e and an argument element of type e, as is the case in (33)), and can be interpreted 'de re' only as a single unit of type e. Such a constraint blocks the generation of (33), but still generates (31), which does not yield the 'bound de re' reading (as we saw). 
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We also correctly predict that (5b) (John believes that every female student likes herself) can have the reading where John mistakes the individuals comprising pairs of the form x, x , but cannot have a reading where John correctly identifies the individuals, but is mistaken about the identity function. In other words, (5b) cannot mean that John's thought is "Each of these individuals likes her aunt".
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To sum up, we have blocked the unattested reading of John believes that every female student likes her mother, but we are left with a theory that does not predict 'bound de re' pronouns.
We conclude that no 'de re' theory that relies solely on movement -of the scoping type or of the 'res'-movement type -can explain the 'bound de re' reading of (1).
14 This is based on i. the fact that LFs like (33) must be blocked so as to avoid overgeneration (and as a result only (31) is available as a 'res'-movement LF of (1)), and ii. our conclusions from §2.1.
We therefore explore an alternative that makes no use of movement, of the scoping kind or of the 'res'-movement kind, but rather encodes guises -or acquaintance functions/relations -in the syntax. Since we won't be making any use of acquaintance with functions, from now on we make the simplifying assumption that individuals are only acquainted with individuals.
3 The solution: concept-generator pronouns 3.1 Belief 'de re' without movement Percus & Sauerland's (2003) concept-generator theory obviates the need for 'res'-movement: a 'de re' expression, according to that theory, is embedded in a larger noun phrase -as an argument of a pronominal element that denotes a concept-generator (to be defined below). For example, the 'de re'
14 It is worth pointing out that there actually is a way to account for 'bound de re' readings within 'res'-movement (see Sharvit 2011), but it requires some questionable assumptions and stipulations. Sharvit's (2011) analysis posits lexical items (OP, every*) that are not independently motivated. Translated to 'res'-movement, Sharvit's analysis works only if: (a) OP in (i) applies to female-student-w 0 to yield a set of ordered pairs (whose first and second members are the same); (b) the trace T 5 in (i) is a variable over sets of ordered pairs; and (c) every* in (i) (as opposed to the standard every) applies to a set of pairs to yield something of type e, e, t , t .
These assumptions are clearly ad-hoc, with the result that such a theory lacks any explanatory force. 
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(ii) believe GC g (w) (p e, s, e,e , s, e,t )(x) = 1 iff there is a suitable concept-generator
16 Concept-generators are bijections between the individuals an attitude holder is acquainted with and descriptions (i.e. individual concepts) the attitude holder has for those individuals. Accordingly, as Anand (2007) Crucially, for any x, any relevant concept-generator G such that x ∈ Dom(G), and any of John's doxastic alternatives w, it is possible that G 8 g [8→G] (x)(w) ≠
x.
To account for 'bound de re' pronouns, we also assume: (a) that bound pronouns as well as traces can be arguments of concept-generator pronouns, as in (45a); 17 and (b) that the semantics of believe is the type-flexible semantics in (46) (which allows LFs to contain as many concept-generator pronouns as there are 'res-es'), rather than the type-rigid semantics in (43). In (46), n is the number of arguments of type e, s, e that p takes.
18 In addition, con(c) x,w,n is a non-empty set of n-long sequences of concept-generators supplied by context c that are suitable for x in w (a sequence of conceptgenerators S is suitable for x in w when each member of S is suitable for x in w).
Accordingly, the 'simple bound' reading of (1) (with mother construed 'de dicto') can be obtained as in (47), where the two concept-generator pronouns are co-indexed; and the 'bound de re' reading (again, with mother construed 'de dicto') is obtained as in (48), where the two concept-generator-pronouns are not co-indexed.
(47) 'Simple bound' reading; the two concept-generators are co-indexed:
17 Allowing concept generators to adjoin to 'de dicto' traces risks over-generation. See the appendix for discussion.
18 This is determined by the number of concept-generator abstractors in the LF: 
such that Dox John,@ ⊆ w ∈ D s : {y ∈ D e : y is a female student in @} ⊆ {y ∈ D e : G(y)(w) likes mother(w)(H(y)(w)) in w} .
For the 'de re' ascription in (48) to be true, John needn't think anything of the form, "x likes x's mother" (since t 2 and her 2 , though co-indexed, are arguments of distinct concept-generators).
Previous work already provides the essential ingredients of our proposal. However, to our knowledge, no one till now has shown that there are readings that only the concept-generator theory can generate. Let us elaborate on this point.
What is borrowed, what is new
First, notice an interesting technical difference between the 'res'-movement theory and the concept-generator theory. In practice, the number of 'res'-denoting expressions can be bigger than one (as in John believed that Mary introduced Bill to Sue). On the 'res'-movement theory, we have to move all three 'res-es' (and ensure the type-flexibility of believe re ). On the conceptgenerator theory, we can work with one type-fixed believe GC (the one in (43) 
(where himself 3 g = Ortcutt)
But since (51) doesn't necessarily contain a bound variable, all it shows is that if we are to adopt the concept-generator theory, we have to adopt a typeflexible version of believe. It doesn't show that the concept-generator theory has any semantic advantage over 'res'-movement, as the relevant reading of (51) is easily accounted for with 'res'-movement:
Percus & Sauerland (2003), on the other hand, make the point that bound pronouns can be arguments of concept-generator variables. But the examples they discuss involve pronouns bound by quantifiers that appear above the attitude verb, as in (54). (54) Every candidate believes that he will win.
(Every candidate x, pointing at a picture of x, without necessarily realizing that it is a picture of x: "This guy will win") Again, (54) only shows that if the concept-generator theory is to be adopted, it needs to allow concept-generators to apply to bound pronouns. What (54) crucially does not show is that the concept-generator theory has any advantage over 'res'-movement. Crucially, only those examples where the pronoun is bound by an operator situated "below" believe show the superiority of the concept-generator theory (from a semantic point of view): as we saw, these cases are not covered by 'res'-movement. It is worth pointing out that the concept-generator theory is not the only theory that offers a compositional semantics of 'de re' ascriptions without movement. In fact, within Lewis's counterpart theory (Lewis 1979) , a simple LF such as (56) (for John believes that Mary is French) can yield the desired reading ( (56) itself is, of course, not taken directly from Lewis's work, but is rather an attempt to implement his ideas within a syntactic framework).
Mary-w 2 does not denote the "real" Mary, but rather a counterpart of Mary in w 2 g [2→w] , for any w in Dox John,@ . In attitude reports, the counterpart relation is mediated by a contextually-supplied acquaintance relation -in Lewis's terms, "counterpart by acquaintance". On this view, the 'res' is not a syntactic argument of believe, and no movement is necessary. Importantly, the counterpart-based LFs, unless augmented with a counterpart-selecting mechanism, fail with multiple co-referential 'res-es' in general, and 'bound de re' pronouns in particular. It is possible that counterpart selection is done in the semantics, rather than the syntax (in which case our claim that the syntax must be "transparent" -i.e., that counterpart selection is done by pronominal elements -might be too strong). We do not consider this option to be radically different from what we are proposing, or, for that matter, from what Percus & Sauerland propose. 19 This concludes the discussion of our main claim regarding 'bound de re' pronouns. In the next section we try to think more seriously about the quantificational force of believe. This issue raises more problems than solutions, 19 We thank Angelika Kratzer and Paolo Santorio for their input on this issue.
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Bound 'de re' pronouns and the LFs of attitude reports but we think that it is nevertheless worth discussing, because it is intimately tied to how ascriptions with quantificational binders in the embedded clause are interpreted in multiple-guise scenarios (which constructions motivate the existence of 'bound de re' pronouns in the first place).
4 Believe as a universal quantifier over concept-generators
The problem of negative quantifiers
Let us go back to the examples that motivated the Kaplan/Lewis/Cresswell & von Stechow view of "relational" believe.
(57) a. Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy and, at the same time, he believes that Ortcutt is not a spy.
b. John believes that Mary is French and, at the same time, he believes that Mary is German.
These examples are predicted to be well-formed both by the "relational" theories of believe and by the concept-generator theory, because the acquaintance functions/concept-generators are introduced existentially. The type-flexible semantics for believe is repeated in (58).
But there is reason to believe that "existential" believe is sometimes too weak. 20 Let us discuss in more detail the possibility that believe sometimes quantifies universally over acquaintance functions/concept-generators. Specifically, universal quantification seems to be invoked when the quantifier binding a 'de re' pronoun/trace is downward-entailing. Consider in this regard (59a) and (59b): the former is acceptable in scenario (60a) as well as (60b); the latter is acceptable only in (60c).
(59) a. John believes that every female student is French.
20 Our criticism of the "existential" theory will also apply to Aloni's (2005) quantifier-less theory of 'de re' ascription. As mentioned in fn. 16, concept-generators can be thought of as conceptual covers. So a quantifier-less concept-generator theory will be equivalent to Aloni's quantifier-less conceptual-covers theory. We show that you often need to derive stronger truth conditions than either a wide-scoping existential-style analysis or a quantifierless analysis can produce. For simplicity, we limit our remarks to "traditional" existential theories.
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(60) John looks at three pairs of pictures of actual female students -two pictures of Mary, two pictures of Sally, two pictures of Betty -and doesn't realize i. that they're students (in fact, he thinks they're professors), and
ii. that the same person is depicted in each pair. The other three -including the professor in blue [who also happens to be Mary], the professor in gray [who also happens to be Sally] and the professor in pink [who also happens to be Betty] -are also Italian."
However, given (58) we expect (59b) to be acceptable in (60a) as well (see (62b)). That this fails to obtain (that is to say, that the right predictions are made only regarding (59a); see (61b)) suggests that believe has a "universal" reading, as in (63).
(61) a. John believe FGC -w 0 (62) a. John believe FGC -w 0
y is a female student in @}∩
Suppose σ 1 is a concept-generator that yields "the professor in red" for Mary, "the professor in yellow" for Sally and "the professor in green" for Betty; and σ 2 is a concept-generator that yields "the professor in blue" for Mary, "the professor in gray" for Sally and "the professor in pink" for Betty (so con(c) John,@,1 = {σ 1 , σ 2 }). The judgments reported for (59b) are predicted by (63): (64) a. John believes U -w 0
y is a female student in @}∩ {y ∈ D e : σ 1 (y)(w) or σ 2 (y)(w) is French in w} = .
(For every concept generator G ∈ con(c) John,@,1 and all of John's doxastic alternatives w in @, no actual female student y is such that G(y)(w) is French in w.)
On the other hand, if con(c) John,@,1 = {σ 1 , σ 2 }, the judgments reported for (59a) are predicted by (58); (63) imposes truth conditions that are too strong for a scenario like (60a): since for each female student x, each of John's doxastic alternatives w is such that σ 2 (x)(w ) fails in w to be French, believe U plus con(c) John,@,1 = {σ 1 , σ 2 } incorrectly predicts that (59a) should be false. An anonymous reviewer calls our attention to another case where universal believe makes predictions that are not quite right. Suppose there are three American students who like to dress up as men and walk around town playing tricks on people. On day 1, the three students meet John and pretend (successfully) to be Italian. On day 2, they dress in another disguise and again meet John, but this time they pretend (again successfully) to be French. John doesn't realize that the students are students or American, nor does he identify the people he met on day 1 with the people he met on day 2. Then the following ascriptions both seem to be true:
(65) a. On day 1, John believed that none of the three female students was French.
b. On day 2, John believed that none of the three female students was Italian.
This case shows that if universal quantification is invoked to explain 'de re' readings with negative quantifiers, it needs to be restricted to salient sets of concept generators. In example (65a), the salient concept generator(s) will map the female students to the people that John met on day 1, and in example (65b) the salient concept generator(s) will map the female students, naturally, to the people that John met on day 2. Let us therefore assume that both versions of believe are available -or, alternatively, that the grammar contains only believe U , but con(c) x,w,n can be "shrunk" to a set possibly containing just one sequence of conceptgenerators. For some reason (that we do not understand) the universal semantics is often preferred when the 'de re' quantifier is downward-entailing. Alternatively, the singleton shrinking of con(c) x,w,n only happens when the concept-generator's argument isn't bound by a downward-entailing quantifier.
(Note that this isn't simply a matter of the bound 'de re' pronoun being in a downward-entailing environment; e.g. a natural reading of no one believes Ralph is smart entails that no one believes of Ralph under any guise that he is smart.) The asymmetry is further evidenced by the contrast between the following sentences, which contain 'bound de re' pronouns. As before, John is
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Bound 'de re' pronouns and the LFs of attitude reports looking at the pairs Mary, Mary , Sally, Sally , and Betty, Betty -i.e. pairs of photographs.
(66) a. John believes that every female student likes her friend.
b. John believes that no female student likes her friend.
As we already saw, intuitions regarding (66a) are explained by "existential" believe FGC . But notice that intuitions regarding (66b) are not: the truth of (66b) requires that, in John's "mind", it isn't just the case that one member of each pair doesn't like the friend of the other member, but rather, it must be that neither of them likes the friend of the other. This is predicted by believe U , It should be noted that even when the 'de re' quantifier is downward-entailing, the existential version of believe is sometimes chosen. One case is when the context imposes (lexical or non-lexical) presuppositions that make it impossible to implement "universal" believe. An example that comes to mind is John believes that no female student voted for her opponent: if, in John's mind, not every relevant individual is a candidate, then he cannot entertain the "reciprocal" belief predicted by "universal" believe U , but he may still be able to entertain the "non-reciprocal" belief predicted by "existential" believe FGC (though again, this could result from coupling "universal" believe with an appropriately restricted con(c) x,w,n , i.e. one whose second member only ever outputs candidates).
3:33
Additional data
More evidence for universal quantification is provided by only-constructions, as in (68), in a scenario where John is looking at pairs of pictures of all relevant women.
(68) John believes that only Mary is French.
The first thing to note for this case is that the predictions of existential believe are spectacularly wrong. Say the relevant domain of individuals is {Mary, Sally}. Then, given a standard semantics for only (and assuming that the presuppositions triggered by only can be accommodated in the scope of the attitude à la Heim 1992) , (68) Relative to our scenario, the truth of (69) Bound 'de re' pronouns and the LFs of attitude reports which x appears must be non-French; but for Mary herself, it suffices that just one of the "Mary's" be French. In other words, the sentence is judged true in scenario (70a) and false in scenario (70b) by all speakers, as predicted by universal believe U . However, our consultants still judge it true in the scenario described in (70c), which suggests that the presupposition contributed by only is evaluated relative to existential believe, suggesting the lexical entry in (71). 
On the other hand, for other cases the existentially quantified definedness condition is arguably too weak. Consider Mary thinks only John remembers Steve. Even on the 'de re' reading, it should presuppose that Mary thinks of each alternative to John that he is alive. But the definedness condition is consistent with Mary failing to think so. We have to leave this issue open.
We've argued that the facts may motivate a (partially) "universal" instantiation of believe. Another conceivable proposal allows the existential quantifier over sequences of concept-generators to take non-maximal scope (i.e., below no female student in (59b) or only Mary in (68)).
22 This is an appealing account in some respects, but it faces a major difficulty: belief in a singular proposition (speaking loosely) is usually considered a necessary feature of 'de re' belief. In other words, for John to have a 'de re' belief about someone, there must be some x of whom John believes so-and-so. But if concept-generators can vary across belief alternatives, 'de re' belief is dissociated from singular belief: a sentence like John believes Ortcutt killed Ralph is mapped to True if, for each of John's belief alternatives w, there is some concept-generator G such that G(Ortcutt)(w) killed Ralph in w. This seems to be an undesirable outcome: if John thinks, "it was either A or B who killed Ralph", where A, B, an C are guises under which John knows Ortcutt, and where John incorrectly believes A, B, and C to be different people, speakers hesitate to judge John believes Ortcutt killed Ralph true (similarly for the singular-belief-ascribing there's someone who John believes killed Ralph).
On the other hand, consider (72a) in a context where John sees Mary on three different occasions (and fails to recognize her each time): there is one person who admires her on the first occasion, and there is another person who admires her on the other two occasions. Relative to this scenario, (72a) seems relatively well-formed, which may suggest that our semantics should allow acquaintance functions/concept-generators to vary under exactly two people. But if narrow existential closure over (sequences of) concept-generators is out, how are the correct truth conditions derived? One option is admitting parameterized concept-generators (cf. Skolemized choice functions) as in (72b). This move allows acquaintance functions/concept-generators to vary with admirers while avoiding the over-generation associated with free exis-22 Thanks to Nicholas Fleisher and Ezra Keshet for discussion of this and related points.
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Bound 'de re' pronouns and the LFs of attitude reports tential closure over concept-generators. (Note that con(c) x,w,n is now a set of parametrized concept generators.) (72) a. John believes that Mary is admired by exactly two people.
b. For every G e, e, s,e in con(c) John,@,1 ,
But a familiar problem from the Skolemized choice functions literature bedevils us here. The original problem, noticed by Chierchia (2001) and discussed by Kratzer (2003) , Schlenker (2006) , Solomon (2011) , a.o., is that unattested readings arise when a Skolemized choice function is bound by a non-distributive quantifier such as no one or exactly two students. Take the LF in (73), corresponding to no student read a (certain) book. If f is resolved to the function mapping each student x to (a function from the set of books to) the single book x didn't read, then no student read a (certain) book is predicted to have truth conditions to the effect that no student read every book, a meaning it lacks (though see Kratzer 2003 for another view). (assuming that Dom(G) is just the relevant 5 individuals), the truth conditions in (72b) will be satisfied. Now, for this to really trouble us, we'd have to get a grip on why this sort of Skolemized concept-generator would make it into con(c) John,@,1 in the first place (cf. e.g. Skolemized concept-generator theory must be seen as a very preliminary proposal.
5 Summary 'Bound de re' readings of pronouns support a non-relational semantics for believe, one which has a single, "clausal", internal argument and which quantifies over concept-generators. In addition, the kinds of scenarios required to evaluate 'bound de re' readings -scenarios involving beliefs about individuals in the domain of an attitude-embedded quantifier whom the attitude holder knows in multiple ways (possibly without identifying that these guises actually correspond to a single individual) -lead to the conclusion that believe at least sometimes quantifies universally, rather than existentially, over concept-generators.
6 Appendix: 'De dicto/de re' and iterated belief reports An area of potential over-generation in the concept-generator theory bears mentioning. We must somehow rule out configurations where (in simple, noniterated belief reports) concept-generators are adjoined to traces/pronouns bound by 'de dicto' expressions; e.g. the system shouldn't generate 'de re' ascriptions about unicorns or whoever a misinformed attitude holder takes the king of France to be (though we'll refine this characterization shortly). The first of these (unicorns) might follow from how concept-generators are defined -in particular the stipulation that the attitude holder be acquainted with each 'res' in the domain of the concept-generator. However, the second (the king of France) certainly does not. After all, a deranged William Daley (Barack Obama's chief of staff) might come to believe that Barack Obama, whom he works for and is very much acquainted with, is ('de dicto') the king of France. But Daley might also unwittingly know Obama under two guises A and B; he might think that A is the upstanding Barack Obama (for Daley, the king of France), and that B is a notorious spy. Daley thinks there's a unique king of France and that the king of France is a spy doesn't have any true readings here, but so long as there's a G ∈ con(c) Daley,@,1 such that for any 
to G(KoF(w))(w).
24 We should also rule out some configurations where concept-generators are sisters of syntactically 'de se' traces/pronouns (that is, traces/pronouns bound by the 'de se' abstractor, cf. fn. 3). Say Sue thinks she's Mary. Then for any w, x ∈ Dox Sue,@ , x = Mary. So a concept generator adjoined to a 'de se' pronoun (like in (i) below, with λ i a 'de se' abstractor operator which allows the complement clause to denote something in the domain of the 'de se' attitude verb, cf. fns. 1 and 5) supplies a guise for Mary rather than one for Sue. Now say an actual description of Mary is the woman living at 17 Quincy, and, moreover, that Sue is acquainted with Mary and that she believes 'de dicto' that the woman living at 17 Quincy is a total bore -though, naturally, Sue thinks, "Unlike the woman living at 17 Quincy, I'm the life of the party". In other words, Sue doesn't think "I/Mary live(s) at 17 Quincy". Does Sue i believes she i 's a bore have any true readings here? Though the answer seems to be no, the LF in (i) (where λ i is a 'de se' abstractor operator which allows the complement clause to denote something in the domain of the attitude verb, cf. fns. 3 and 6) is mapped to True. 25 Similarly, Sue thinks John believes she's a total bore has a reading where Sue's belief is 'de se', but she's ascribing a 'de re' belief about herself to John -i.e. she might think John knows her under two guises. Presumably the LF underlying this reading has to look something like (ii). So ruling out problematic 'de se/de re' LFs can't simply be a matter of forbidding concept-generators from being adjoined to 'de se' pronouns/traces: Thus, it only makes sense to talk about the 'de dicto'/'de re' distinction in relative terms. In (76), the king of France is 'de dicto' with respect to one attitude operator (namely, believe) but 'de re' with respect to another (namely, think). The relevant generalization for our cases seems to be that a DP cannot be construed 'de re' and 'de dicto' relative to the same attitude operator. More formally:
(76) A concept generator G n cannot adjoin to any node that dominates a world-pronoun bound by the world-binder of G n , or to a trace bound by such a node (where the world-binder of G n is the highest worldbinding lambda c-commanded by λ n ).
